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Hellerstein: Criminal Law Decisions

Off Broadway: The Supreme Court's Criminal Law
Decisions in the 1996 Term Take Second Stage in an
Historic Term
Professor William E. Hellerstein
Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
Our next speaker is going to deal with the subject of criminal
law, Fourth Amendment and related areas. William Hellerstein

has been with us from the beginning of these programs, nine
years ago. I have known William Hellerstein for a much longer
than that. I first came to know him when I was in the Appellate
Division and he was the Chief of the Appeals Bureau of the Legal
Aid Society. All of us on the bench at that time were of the
belief that the Legal Aid Society lawyers, at least the ones
arguing in the Appellate Division, were superior generally to the
Appeals Bureaus of the various District Attorneys offices in the
Second Department. Of course, occasionally, we would have the
privilege of hearing Professor Hellerstein himself. He is, of
course, a professor at Brooklyn Law School and widely regarded
as one of leading authorities on constitutional law and criminal
law, so it's my pleasure now to present him to you.
ProfessorWilliam E. Hellerstein:
The Supreme Court's criminal law decisions of the 1996-97 Term

fade into the background of a term, labeled "historic" by some,' in
which the Court handed down rulings that placed limits on
Congressional power to legislate under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment,2 conscript state and local officials to implement
federal gun control laws, and regulate the content of material on
the Internet,4 upheld state statutes proscribing physician-assisted

2

3

Marcia Coyle, Was This Term istoric,NAT'L LJ., Aug.11, 1997, at B5.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).

4 Reno

v. American Civil Liberties Union, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
337
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suicide,5 allowed a civil lawsuit against the president to go
forward,6 left in tact the line-item veto given the president,7
overturned its prior decision prohibiting local governments from
sending public school teachers into parochial school to provide
remedial education to disadvantaged children,8 and made the
settlement of class actions in mass tort cases more difficult. 9
Nonetheless, a number of criminal decisions were both interesting
and important, with the government once again prevailing more

often than not as the Court maintains its conservative course in this
realm.'"
The Court decided four Fourth Amendment" cases; the
government prevailed in three, the individual in one. In Maryland
v. Wilson'2 the Court, by a 7-2 vote held that the police may order

passengers, as well as drivers, to get out of vehicles stopped for
routine traffic violations. 3 This extended to passengers the "bright-4
line" rule that, twenty years ago, Pennsylvania v. Mimms1

established with respect to drivers.' 5
The defendant was riding in a rental car that was stopped for
speeding and not having a regular license plate.' 6 After the car was
stopped, the officer thought the defendant acted suspiciously and
ordered him out of the car.17 Although the denial of suppression

I Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997). See also Vacco v. Quill,
117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
6 Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997).
7 Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997).
8 Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997), rev'g Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S.
402(1985).
9 Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
1 See William E. Hellerstein, It Was a Very Good Year - For the Government,
13 TouRo L. Rv. 395 (1997).
" U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states in pertinent part:
"[t]he right of the people to be secure ... against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated. . ." Id.
12 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997).
13Id. at 890.
14434 U.S. 106 (1977) (holding a police officer may as a matter of course order

the driver of a lawfully stopped car to exit his vehicle).
15Id.

16 Id. at 107.
17 Id.
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could have been justified on the basis of such conduct, it did not
figure in the Court's decision."

Instead, the Court chose the

occasion to extend the Mimms rule to passengers and to resolve
some of the confusion that had accumulated in lower courts on the
rights of passengers in lawfully stopped vehicles.'
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, took issue with
the state court's refusal to apply Mimms. 2 Mimms had weighed the
state's interest in protecting officers' safety against the liberty
intrusion to an already stopped driver by requiring the driver to get
out of the vehicle.21 Against the state's interest, the liberty interest
was deemed "de minimis" and it succumbed.' Citing statistics
about assaults and killings of police officers during traffic chases
and stops, the Chief Justice concluded that "the same weighty
interest in officer safety is present regardless of whether the
occupant of the stopped car is a driver or passenger."' He noted
also that "the fact that there is more than one occupant of the
vehicle increases the possible sources of harm to the officer."24
Although the Chief Justice conceded that because there is no
probable cause to believe that a passenger has committed any traffic
offense a passenger has a stronger liberty interest than a driver, he
concluded that such an interest was inconsequential, stating that "as
a practical matter, the passengers are already stopped by virtue of
the stop of the vehicle," - an order to exit merely changes their
location.' Also, he pointed out that a passenger has the same
motivation as a driver to use a weapon concealed in the car to
prevent6 the officer from discovering evidence of a more serious
crime.

2

18The state did not argue that Wilson's own conduct gave rise to reasonable
suspicion and thus the issue was deemed waived. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 887 n.1
(Stevens, I., dissenting).
19 Id. at 884.
20 Id. at 885.
21 Id.

22Id.

2
24

Id.
Id.

25Id. at 886.
26id.
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Justice Stevens dissented in Minms,27 and did so here. 28 He
argued that the majority's statistics did not differentiate between
passengers and drivers, between attacks on police launched from
inside vehicles and those launched from outside, or between
jurisdictions that applied Mimms to passengers and those that did
not. 29 Thus, he argued, they did not support the argument that
applying Mimms to passengers will minimize the risk to police
officers. 30 It is noteworthy that the Chief Justice did not attempt to
refute Stevens' statistical analysis. He merely side-stepped it,
stating that it is "regrettable that the empirical data on a subject
such as this are sparse," but that the Court "need not ignore the
data which do exist3 simply because further refinement would be
even more helpful."
Stevens also disputed the majority's claim that orders to a
passenger to exit a vehicle are only de minimi& intrusions.32 He
estimated that the Court's ruling, while affording the police at most
an extremely marginal advantage, as in one instance in 20,O003
stops, would impose a burden on "thousands of innocent
citizens." 34 Because the Court was taking "the unprecedented step
of authorizing seizures that are unsupported by any individual
suspicion whatsoever," he cautioned that the decision "may pose a
more serious threat to individual liberty than the Court realizes." 35
Somewhat surprisingly, Justice Kennedy joined Stevens' dissent
and wrote a brief one of his own. 36 He pointed out that when this
case is combined with last year's "pretext stop" decision in Whren
v. United States,3 7 which held that as long as the police have
stopped a car lawfully for a traffic infraction, their subjective intent
434 U.S. at 115 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
21 Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 886 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
29 Id. at 887 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10Id. at 888.
27 Mimms,

31

32

Id. at 885 n.2.

Id. at 888 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

33 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).

3 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
35 Id. at 890 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
36 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
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is irrelevant, it "puts tens of millions of passengers at risk of
arbitrary control by the police." 38 He stated that assertions that the
police would exercise their new power with discretion and restraint
and that if orders to exit became routine in a particular jurisdiction,
citizens would call for an end to the practice, miss the point. 39
Uttering what I consider one of the best individual rights aphorisms
inrecent memory, Justice Kennedy concluded his dissent with the
reminder that "liberty comes not from officials by grace but from
the Constitution by right." 40
There was little reason to expect that a Court which last term, in
Whren, was untroubled about declaring irrelevant the subjective
motive of police officers when stopping motorists for minor traffic
infractions,41 should concern itself with the increased power exit

orders to passengers gives the police. However, mere commission
by a driver of a minor traffic violation expands considerably police
search opportunities. 42 As one commentator has pointed out,
"when officers order the occupants out of a car, they frequently
see-or claim to see-that some contraband has come into plain
view, either inside the car or on the persons of the occupants. 43
This decision permits them to conduct searches of the car, the
driver, and the passengers far beyond what they are permitted to do
based solely on a traffic stop." 44
In Ohio v. Robinette,4' a seven-member majority also increased
police authority to search automobiles stopped for traffic offenses. 6
The Court, in an opinion also written by the Chief Justice, rejected
the defendant's argument that there is a bright-line rule that requires
a "you are free to go" warning before a lawfully detained
motorist's consent to a search of his or her vehicle will be found
38 Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 890 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
39

Id.
at 891 (Kennedy, J. dissenting).
10 Id. (Kennedy, 1. dissenting).
41 Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774.
42 Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 884.
43 Ira Mickenberg, Criminal Rulings Primarily Benefit the Prosecution, NAT'L
L.J., Aug. 11, 1997, at B14, 15.
44Id.
45 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996).
4Id. at 421.
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voluntary.47 Instead, it held that consent depends on the totality of
circumstances and that the Ohio Supreme Court erred in
establishing a per se rule to the contrary.48
After Robinette had been stopped for speeding, the officer
checked his license and found no outstanding violations. 49 He then
asked Robinette to get out of his car, issued him a verbal warning
and returned his license. 0 Prefacing his inquiry with the statement
"[o]ne question before you get gone," the officer asked Robinette if
he had weapons or drugs in the car." When Robinette said no, the
officer asked for permission to search the car. Robinette agreed,
and the search turned up drugs.52
In declaring the search invalid, the Ohio Supreme Court held that
"citizens stopped for traffic offenses [must] be clearly informed by
the detaining officer when they are free to go after a valid
detention, before an officer attempts to engage in a consensual
interrogation. "53
Chief Justice Rehnquist first disposed of the threshold issue of the
Court's jurisdiction to hear the case in light of the fact that the state
court's decision arguably relied on the state constitution as well as
the federal.54 He stated that the opinion below mentioned the state
constitution only in passing, and that the syllabus.-- the only part of
the opinion through which the Ohio Supreme Court speaks as a
court -- spoke only in very general terms about the basis for the
decision. 5 Therefore, concluded Rehnquist, under Michigan v.
Long, 56 the Ohio Supreme Court did not make a sufficiently clear
statement of the state law basis of its decision to preclude review.57
47

Id.

Id.

48

49

1Id. at 419.

Id.
Id.
52 id.
" State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 699 (Ohio 1995).
54 Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 420.
5 Id.
56 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (holding that when it is not clear that the state court
decision rests on the state constitution, the court will assume it rests on federal
law).
57 Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 420.
50

51
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Turning to the merits, the Chief Justice stated that the Ohio
Supreme Court's "bright-line" approach was inconsistent with the
emphasis, in cases such as Florida v. Royer,58 on the "fact-specific
nature of the reasonableness inquiry" that is the "touchstone" of
the Fourth Amendment.5 9 He also pointed out that the Ohio court's
rule was "very similar" to the argument that the Court rejected in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,60 that no consent could be voluntary
unless the person had been informed of his right to refuse consent.6'
It would be "unrealistic," he concluded, "to require police officers
to always inform detainees that they are free to go before a consent
to search may be deemed voluntary." Of course, one could ask
why it would be "unrealistic" to do so.6 " I thought that if the
Supreme Court says you have to do it, you do it.
Rehnquist also criticized the Ohio court for saying in its syllabus
that a continued detention is invalid if the officer's "motivation" for
it is not related to the purpose of the original stop.' He pointed out
that after last term's decision in Whren, a police officer's subjective
motivations are of no relevance to the validity of the officer's
conduct under the Fourth Amendment. 6' Under Pennsylvania v.
Mimnms, Rehnquist said, the officer's request that Robinette get
out of his car was objectively justifiable.6
Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment but she focused her
attention on the ambiguity of the Ohio Supreme Court's decision
which, because of Michigan v. Long,' contributed to an outcome

is 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (providing that the single sentence or paragraph rule is
disavowed in recognition of the endless variation in facts and circumstances
implicating the Fourth Amendment).
9 Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 421 (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250
(1991)).
6o 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (stating that knowledge of the right to refuse consent is
not the sine qua non of an effective consent).
51 Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 421.
2
6

Id.
Id.

'Id.
424 U.S. 106 (1977).
66Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 421.
67463 U.S. 1032, 1040-42 (1983).
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that she believed the Ohio court did not contemplate.68 In short,
she thought it improbable that the Ohio Supreme Court "understood
its 'first tell-then-ask rule' to be the Federal Constitution's mandate
for the Nation as a whole." 69 She suggested that the Ohio court
meant its rule to be a "prophlyactic measure," and she urged state
courts to be explicit about the basis for their decisions.70
Justice Stevens agreed with the majority that the Fourth
Amendment does not require a bright-line rule on voluntariness.7
However, he dissented on the ground that at the time Robinette's
consent was obtained, Robinette was being detained without
justification and that his consent was the product of that illegal
detention.72 Stevens pointed out that a reasonable person in
Robinette's position would not have felt free to leave.73 In fact, the
officer's testimony that he had secured consent in hundreds of
similar cases, Stevens argued, is explainable only on the assumption
that motorists generally assume that they are legally obliged to
consent to a request to search. 74
The issue of whether the police should be allowed to capitalize on
people's ignorance of their Fourth Amendment rights was resolved
years ago in Schneckloth,75 which held that a police warning that
consent to a search was not obligatory, was not required.76 Critics
of that decision rejected distinctions between the Fifth
Amendment's 77 self-incrimination privilege, protected by the
admonitions mandated by Miranda,78 and Fourth Amendment
68 Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 422 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
69

Id. at 423. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
' Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
7, Id. at 424 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)
13 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)
74 Id. at 425 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
71 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (disdaining a "waiver"
analysis, applicable to Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, for Fourth Amendment
rights preferring instead, a "totality of the circumstances" test).
76 Id.

77 U.S. CONST. amend. V. This Amendment provides in pertinent part: "No
person shall be ... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against

himself, nor deprive of life, liberty, or property, without due process." Id.
78 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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rights, which secure privacy rights. That battle having long been
over, Robinette had no serious chance to muster five votes for a per
se rule imposing a "you are free to go" predicate upon the police.
Although not discussed in the decision, there is an issue that the
authors of the casebook that I use in my Criminal Procedure course
call attention to: the relationship between the definition of
"consent" and the definition of "seizure." In essence, they ask,
should a court treat consent by a detained person differently from
consent by a suspect who has not been seized?79 They point out that

in Schneckloth, the Court determined that a consensual search is
one that is voluntary under all the circumstances, and that in United
States v. Mendenhall," and the line of cases that follow it," the
Court has said that a suspect is "seized" if a reasonable person in
his circumstances would not feel free to leave.82 One obvious
possibility, they suggest, is that these definitions might merge that the same facts that would lead a reasonable person to feel
detained (hence "seized" under the Mendenhall standard) would
also lead the defendant to feel he had to give permission to search
(thereby making consent "involuntary" under Schneckloth).'
Consequently, they conclude, this line of argument suggests a rule
similar to the one adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court -that
coercion rather than consent is presumed where the suspect is
seized, and so the officer must do something affirmative to dispel
RONALD J. ALLEN, RICHARD B. KUHNs & WIlIAM J. STUNTZ,
CONSTITUTIONAL CRIM NAL PROCEDURE, PROFESSOR'S UPDATE 24 (1997).
79

0 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (opinion of Justice Stewart).
See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (plurality opinion). (stating
that had not the police prolonged the defendant's detention, his consent to an
immediate search would have been lawful); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1
(1984) (holding that "the initial contact between the officers and the respondent,
where they simply asked if he would step aside and talk with them, was clearly
the sort of consensual encounter that implicates no Fourth Amendment interest");
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984)
(holding that where employees were questioned regarding their citizenship by
Immigration and Naturalization Service agents, such "encounters were classic
consensual encounters rather than Fourth Amendment seizures.").
8 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553.
1

11

RONALD J. ALLEN, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, PROFESSOR'S

UPDATE 24 (1997).
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the coercion. 4 Hence the requirement of a warning.'5 Somehow,
despite the ostensible logic of this argument, I doubt that the current
Court would be receptive to it.
In light of the concerns which Justice Kennedy expressed in
Maryland v. Wilson16 about the enormous power conferred upon the
police by that case in conjunction with Whren, s7 I would have
thought he would have expressed similar concerns here. In
Robinette, the seizure was justified by a traffic offense but the
search was for drugs.8 The use of traffic stops to secure consent is
certainly possible, especially after Whren. But did the police really
wait for the decision in Whren or were they not using traffic stops
for other purposes for quite some time? Consider that Officer
Newsome, who pulled Robinette over, testified in another case that
he sought consent to search in 786 traffic stops in 1992, the year
Robinette was stopped. 9
The case also bears significant consequence in terms of process.
Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Stevens before her, have been
vehement critics of the Court's decision in Michigan v. Long, 9°
which changed the landscape as to the Supreme Court's adequate,
independent ground jurisprudence. Prior to Long, if there was
ambiguity in a state court's decision as to whether it rested on a
violation of a provision of the state constitution or the federal, the
Supreme Court would decline jurisdiction. 9' Long changed all that
84
85

Id.

86

117 S. Ct. 882, 890-91 (1997) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

87

116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
117 S. Ct. 417 (1996).

88

id.

89

RONALD J. ALLEN, PROFESSOR'S UPDATE 25(1997).
90 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). The Court held that:
[W]hen, as in this case, a state court decision fairly appears
to rest primarily on federal law, and when the adequacy and
independence of any possible state law is not clear from the
face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable
explanation that that the state court decided the case that way
it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so.
Id. at 1040-41.
91Id. at 1038. See also Lynch v. New York, 293 U.S. 52 (1934). The Court

holding that:
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by inverting the rule so that ambiguity guaranteed reviewability,
assuming of course the Supreme Court's interest in the case; only a
clear statement from the state court that its ruling is based on the
state constitution can now avert review by the Supreme Court.'
Two aspects of Long have always puzzled me, although one is
easier to understand than the other. The Court's pre-Long practice
of declining review in the face of ambiguity had always been
consistent with the Court's institutional constraints against deciding
federal constitutional questions unnecessarily. 93 Adherence to such
a policy was long considered a "conservative" approach and one
that was sensitive to federalism concerns. But it was the Burger
Court, considered much more conservative than the Warren Court,
that adopted a policy that swept into the Court's purview ambiguous
state court rulings in which state courts afforded their citizens
greater protections that those mandated by the federal constitution.
As Justice Stevens argued in his dissent in Long, the Supreme Court
has little legitimate interest in telling state courts that they had gone
to far in protecting individual rights where that protection may have
rested on state constitutional principles. 9 The reason I am not
overly puzzled by this aspect of Long is that it has long been clear
that the Burger Court and now the Rehnquist Court believes firmly
that it should decide as many cases as possible where a defendant
was successful below and thereby allow the Court to shape its
criminal law jurisprudence more harmoniously with a crime-control
model than a due process model. Long's departure from previous
practice was essential to a more rapid fulfillment of that agenda.
It is the second aspect of the Long universe that continues to
perplex me and which involves, not the Supreme Court, but the
[Wlhere the judgment of the state court rests on two grounds,
one involving a federal question and the other not, or if it
does not appear upon which two grounds the judgment was
based, and the ground independent of a federal question is
sufficient in itself to sustain it, this court will not take
jurisdiction.
Id. at 55.
92 Id. at 1031-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
93Lynch, 293 U.S. at 55
1 Id. at 1068-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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state courts. If, under Long, as Justice Ginsburg reminds us, a state
court decision can be insulated from Supreme Court review by a
plain statement that the decision rests exclusively on state
constitutional grounds, why is it that state courts continue to
produce opinions that are ambiguous and thereby enable the
Supreme Court to stretch the concept of ambiguity to suit its crime
control agenda? I don't know that there is a single explanation for
this phenomenon. In my own discussions with many judges, I have
been given various explanations. One is what I call the "float
theory," - that to get agreement, one or more judges may insist
that the opportunity for review by the Supreme Court should be left
open so that the Court's intelligence (not insubstantial) can at least
be gleaned. The second is what I call the "I forgot theory." This
theory needs no further explanation. The third is the "I thought we
did it theory." And you may have (as the Ohio court in Robinette
may have believed). But you didn't do it well enough!
In Richards v. Wisconsin,9 the Court at least was consistent in
rejecting a second "bright-line" rule request, this time one sought
by the state. Two years ago, in Wilson v. Arkansas,96 the Court
held that compliance with the common law knock-and-announce
rule is mandated by the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
requirement.97
However, the Court also stated that exigent
circumstances
can
render
some
unannounced
entries
constitutional. 9'
Before Wilson was decided, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court had established a blanket rule that permitted noknock entries in all cases involving search warrants in felony drug
investigations. 99 In Richards, the Wisconsin court held that nothing
in Wilson undermined the validity of its blanket rule, which was
based on the destructibility of evidence and on the connection
between drug dealing and violence. 10o

91 117 S. Ct. 1416 (1997).
96 514 U.S. 927 (1995).

97Id. at 934.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 935-36.

100 State v. Richards,

549 N.W.2d 218, .220 (Wis. 1996).
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In a unanimous decision written by Justice Stevens, the Court
reversed, holding that the Fourth Amendment requires an
examination of the facts on a case-by-case basis before the knockand-announce requirement can be dispensed with, and that the
police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and
announcing would, under the particular circumstances, be either
dangerous, futile or damaging to the investigation.10' Stevens
pointed out that there will be situations in which "the asserted
governmental interests in preserving evidence and maintaining
safety may not outweigh the individual privacy interests intruded
upon by a no-knock entry."'o2 One example that he gave was the
execution by the police of a warrant at a time when no one
connected with the drug crime is present."" He stated that
"Wisconsin's blanket rule impermissibly insulates these cases from
judicial review." '0 Refuting the state's argument that the Fourth
Amendment's chief concern is the police entry itself, Stevens noted
that occupants of premises to be searched retain constitutionally
cognizable interests in avoiding the destruction of property
attendant to some forced entries and in being given an opportunity
to dress themselves. I 5
Justice Stevens also pointed out that a blanket exception for drug
cases would threaten to swallow the rule, stating that "[i]f a per se
exception were allowed for each category of criminal investigation
that included a considerable - albeit hypothetical- risk of danger to
officers or destruction of evidence, the knock-and-announce
element of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement
would be meaningless." 'o
For Richards himself, fending off the state's quest for a per se
rule was a pyrrhic victory. His conviction remained intact because
on the facts of the case, the Court determined that police failure to
knock and announce was reasonable. 7 A police officer disguised
10' Richards, 117 S. Ct. at 1421.
Iom Id.
103id.
104 Id.

105

d. at 1421 n.5.
101 Id. at 1421.
'0oId. at 1422.
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as a maintenance worker knocked on the door of a hotel room for
which the police had a warrant."0 8 When Richards opened the stillchained door to peek outside, he saw one of the uniformed officers
and slammed the door. 1 9 Justice Stevens concluded that it was
reasonable for the officers to believe that Richards would try to
destroy evidence, so they were justified in bursting in
immediately. 10 This was so even though the magistrate who issued
the warrant had specifically rejected the police request for
permission for a no-knock entry."' Stevens explained that the
reasonableness of a no-knock entry must be evaluated in light of the
facts known to the officers at the time of the entry, and "the
magistrate could not have anticipated in every particular the
circumstances that would confront the officers when they arrived at
112
Richards' hotel room."
The importance of this case depends very much on how seriously
lower courts implement the clear message that the Fourth
Amendment does not tolerate categorical exemptions from its ambit
based on the type of crime that is under investigation. There have
been a goodly number of courts that, prior to Richards, have taken
to upholding police searches based on exigent circumstances that
are often so broad as to incorporate an entire category of crime. In
a notable warrantless drug search case in a Second Circuit case
several years ago, the court's rather expansive view of exigent
circumstances led Judge Kearse, in dissent, to remark that "[a]fter
this decision there appears to be little left of the warrant
requirement in narcotics cases.""1 3 I mentioned this case two years
'0' Id.at 1419.
109
Id.
0
,1
Id. at 1422.
"' Id. at 1418-19.
12 Id. at 1422. Given the outcome of the case, the Court did not have to reach
the state's argument that even when a no-knock entry is deemed unreasonable, the
inevitable discovery doctrine would render the evidence uncovered during the
search admissible. Id. In Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995), the Court
also did not reach the issue because it had not been raised in the lower courts. Id.
at 937 n.4. I adhere to my belief that "inevitably" the Court will.
113 United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 777 (2d Cir. 1990) (Kearse, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1119.(1991).
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ago in my discussion of Wilson, pointing out that the fact specific
nature of the exigency inquiry allowed by the Court as to the noknock requirement made Supreme Court supervision of abuses
extremely difficult."1

I don't know if Judge Kearse feels any better

now that Richards rejects categorization, but I do just a tad. I think
a unanimous admonition from the Court that categorical carve-outs
of crime categories are unacceptable sends a positive message to
some judges who might otherwise tilt against Fourth Amendment
protections in a discrete crime category such as drugs.
In Chandler v. Miller,l 5 the Court finally found a suspicionless
search that did not meet the requirements of its relatively new
"special needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment when it struck
down a Georgia statute that required candidates for specified state
offices to certify that they tested negative for certain drugs within
30 days of qualifying for nomination or election." 6 By an 8-1 vote,
the Court held that the state failed to identify a "special need" that
would justify subjecting
candidates for public office to a
7
search."
suspicionless
Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg rejected the Eleventh
Circuit's conclusion that the state had a legitimate interest to ensure
that office holders are "'appreciative of the perils of drug use'" and
possessed of "'the highest levels of honesty, clear-sightedness, and
clear-thinking.'""' Instead, she applied the principles that have
emerged from the Court's three prior "special needs" cases which
upheld suspicionless searches, Treasury Employees v. Von Raab "9
(Customs Service employees), Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Assn."2 (railway employees in the aftermath of an
accident) and Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton 2 1 (student
See W'flliam E. HeUerstein, Tiptoeing Through the Tulips: The Supreme
Court's Major But Modest By Comparison, Criminal Lav Rulings During the
1994-95 Term, 12 TouRo L. REv. 267, 290 (1996).
115 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997).
16 Id. at 1305.
117 Id. at 1303.
18
114

Id. at 1300.
119 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
120 489
121

U.S. 602 (1989).

515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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athletes), and distinguished them on their facts. She pointed out
that these cases establish the principle that, to survive a Fourth
Amendment challenge, a suspicionless search must be based on
"special needs" beyond the normal need for law enforcement and
that courts must undertake a context-specific inquiry, examining
closely the competing private and public interests advanced by the
parties. 122

Applying these principles to the state's argument that unlawful
drug use jeopardizes the discharge of public functions and
undermines public confidence, Justice Ginsburg concluded that
nothing in the record even hinted that the state's concerns were real
rather than hypothetical and that nothing compared to the showings
made in Skinner and Vernonia, respectively, of substance abuse by
railway employees engaged in safety-sensitive tasks and the sharp
rise in students' use of unlawful drugs." 2 That the Court, in Von
Raab, upheld the drug-testing program without any evidence of
drug abuse by Customs Service employees was of no consequence
either, Justice Ginsburg concluded; she emphasized that their work
directly involved drug interdiction or the carrying of firearms.'2 4
By contrast, the Georgia officials at issue "typically do not perform
high-risk, safety sensitive tasks, and the required certification
immediately aids no interdiction effort."'25 She also distinguished
Von Raab on the ground that candidates for public office "are
subject to relentless scrutiny" whereas the employees in Von Raab
received less scrutiny than most.12 1 She further pointed out that
operationally, the Georgia statutory scheme neither effectively
identified candidates who violate anti-drug laws nor meaningfully
deterred illicit drug users from seeking election to state office: there
is no element of surprise about the test, and most drug-using
candidates could abstain long enough to avoid detection.' 27 For
Justice Ginsburg, the bottom line was that the need revealed by the
122 Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1301.
23 d. at 1302-04.
24
1 1d. at 1304.
125 Id. at 1304-05.
"6Id. at 1304.
127Id. at 1303-04.
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Georgia statute is "symbolic, 'not special' as that term draws
meaning from our case law," and that "[h ] owever well meant, [the
statute] diminishes personal privacy for a symbol's sake." "
In his lone dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist found the Georgia
statute well within the principles of the three "special needs"
precedents. 2 9 He read them as holding that "if there was a proper
governmental purpose other than law enforcement, there was a
'special need' and the Fourth Amendment then required the familiar
balancing between that interest and the individual's privacy
interest. " "' On the individual's privacy interest, he was quick to
point out that "[u]nder normal Fourth Amendment analysis, the
individual's expectation of privacy is an important factor in the
equation."' But here, the Court perversely relies on the fact that a
candidate for office gives up so much privacy * * * as a reason for
sustaining a Fourth Amendment claim." 12 Relying on the Court's
previous concession that "privacy concerns ordinarily implicated by
urinanalysis drug-testing are 'negligible,'" Rehnquist struck the
purpose of identifing drug
balance in favor of Georgia's legitimate
33
office.1
for
candidates
users who were
In past appearances at this symposium, I was critical of all of the
Court's "special needs" decisions, especially Von RaabM and
Vernonia;3 1 I was more "balanced" as to Skinner. 6 My
overriding concern has been that since Terry v. Ohio,'37 the Court
has departed so extensively from the probable cause and warrant
requirements that Fourth Amendment rights are held hostage to
constant assault from the day to day exigencies of the battle against
AId. at 1305.
19 Id. at 1306 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
130
Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
31
id.(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1 Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 1307 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
134 William E. Hellerstein, Fourth Amendment, 6 TouRo L. REv. 31, 32-45
(1989).
135 Hellerstein, supranote 115, at 292-300.
136

Hellerstein, supranote 135, at 37-38.

392 U.S. 1 (1967) (upholding stops and frisks based on reasonable
suspicion).
13
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crime and the perceived need of government to make whatever
adjustments are deemed necessary. Thus, I am pleased with the
Court's ruling in Chandler. But I do not think it calls for
celebration with the opening of a fine vintage Pomerol; indeed,
anything other than a vin ordinaire would be inappropriate.
For the reasons set forth by Justice Ginsburg (and as an 8-1 vote
signifies) this was a relatively easy case. In my estimation, it was
made easy by the fact that only Georgia had enacted such a statute
and that the record, legislative and litigated, was empty. But if a
significant number of states had enacted similar statutes, and the
record was fuller, the result might have been different. That the
Court saw fit to embark on a "special needs" doctrine and extend it
to the point reached in Vernonia, leaves it there for potential future
erosion of privacy interests.
However, until Chandler, the
direction of the "special needs" doctrine had been all one way-adverse to individual privacy interests. In a way it has been like
playing baseball on a field with no foul lines. It is at least of some
comfort to have some indication from the Court as to what it
considers a foul ball. But the perimeter of the entire field remains to
be defined and there may yet be plenty of room for the
government's "special needs" hits on the Fourth Amendment to
drop in safely.
Although I do not wish to minimize the importance of the Court's
Fourth Amendment work last term, none of the four cases were
"blockbusters." On the other hand, the decision in Kansas v.
Hendricks, 38 upholding the validity of Kansas's Sexually Violent
Predator Act comes close to deserving that appellation.
The Kansas statute provides for the involuntary civil commitment
of "any person who has been convicted of or charged with a
sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality
or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage
in... predatory acts of sexual violence." 139 The statute does not
use the term "mental illness" and defines "mental abnormality" as
"a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or
volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually
138 117

'

S. Ct. 2072 (1997).

KAN. STAT. ANN.

§ 59-29a02(a) (1996).
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violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to
the health and safety of others."' 4° The statute's preamble states
specifically that the statute is aimed at "a small but extremely
dangerous group of sexually violent predators... who do not have
a mental disease or defect that renders them appropriate for
treatment" under Kansas' general civil commitment law. "' The
preamble further states that the law is directed against those who
"generally have anti-social personality features which are
unamenable to existing mental illness treatment modalities," that
they need long-term treatment, and that the prognosis for treating
them in prison is poor. 142 People found to be sexually violent
predators under the act are committed indefinitely. 4 1 Although
their cases must be reviewed annually, they may be confined for
life if the reviewing panel does not find them to be cured of the
disorder that renders them predators.'"
Although I believe the Court would have upheld the statute in any
case, the peculiar facts of Hendricks' own situation certainly made
it easy. In 1984 Hendricks, who had a history of child sexual
molestation dating to 1955, was convicted of taking "indecent
liberties" with two 13-year-old boys. 4 After serving nearly 10
years of his sentence, he was scheduled to enter a halfway house. 4 6
However, before his release date, the State filed a petition to
commit him civilly as a sexually violent predator. 47 Hendricks

challenged the statute on substantive due process, ex postfacto, and
double jeopardy grounds but the trial court reserved decision on the
constitutional challenges, found there was probable cause to support
a finding that Hendricks was a sexually violent predator, and
ordered that he be evaluated in a state hospital. 48

140 Hendricks,
141

117 S. Ct. at 2077.

Id.

142Id.

143 Id. at 2078.
144 Id.
145

Id.

146 Id.
147 Id.
148Id.
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At the jury trial to determine whether he was a sexually violent
predator, Hendricks not only testified to his long history of sexually
deviant behavior, but also that despite receiving professional help,
he continued to harbor sexual desires for children and that
whenever he was not confined, he had repeatedly abused children
and, that the only sure way he could keep from sexually abusing
children in the future was to die.149 It also didn't help that his own
stepdaughter and stepson testified that they had been subjected to
repeated sexual abuse by Hendricks. 50 That the jury unanimously
found that Hendricks was a sexually violent predator is about as
shocking as Captain Reynaud's "discovery" of gambling at Rick's
in Casablanca. 5' Nonetheless, the Kansas Supreme Court held that
due process by not requiring a finding
the act violated substantive
52
of "mental illness."
By a 5-4 vote, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, the Supreme
Court reversed the Kansas Supreme Court's due process ruling and
also rejected Hendricks's double jeopardy and ex post facto
claims.' 53 Justice Thomas held that the act's definition of "mental
abnormality" satisfied substantive due process requirements
because when it was combined with the statute's requirement of
proof that a person is actually dangerous to himself or others, it
overcame the Court's prior decisions that future dangerousness
alone is ordinarily not enough to justify indefinite voluntary
confinement. 5 4 Justice Thomas further stated that there was
nothing talismanic about the term "mental illness," emphasizing
that legal definitions of mental conditions do not have to be
coterminous with those of the medical profession.' 55 Instead, he
pointed out that the Kansas statute was similar to statutes that
provide for civil commitment of people who suffer from a
"volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their

149 Id.
11

Id. at 2079 n.2.

'5'
152

CASABLANCA (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer) 1942.
In re Hendricks, 919 P.2d 129, 138 (Kan. 1996).

0

153
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081.

15 Id. at 2080-81.
155Id.
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control." 116 He noted also that Hendricks conceded that he was a
pedophile and that pedophilia is classified as a serious mental
157
disorder.
In rejecting Hendricks' claim that the act was punitive, Justice
Thomas dealt a knockout blow to Hendricks' double jeopardy and
ex post facto claims. He stated that commitment under the act does
not implicate retribution or deterrence and, although it requires a
prior conviction or charge, it "does not affix culpability for prior
criminal conduct;" prior crimes are used solely as evidence of
Further indicia of
mental abnormality or future dangerousness.'
the statute's non-punitive purpose, Thomas stated, were its lack of a
scienter requirement, its focus on persons who are unlikely to be
deterred by the threat of confinement, its provision for immediate
release if the person is adjudged to be safe to be at large, and that
the confinement conditions for persons covered by the act are
essentially those of other civilly committed individuals.!59
For me, the most interesting aspect of case is the way the
treatment (or non-treatment issue, if you will) was approached.
The Kansas Supreme Court had concluded that the lack of treatment
for sexually violent predators made the statute punitive. 10 It stated
that "[it is clear that the overriding concern of the legislature is to
continue the segregation of sexually violent offenders from the
public. Treatment with the goal of reintegrating them into society
is incidental, at best. The record reflects that treatment for sexually
violent predators is all but nonexistent." '61 Moreover, the Court
poinied out, by not utilizing existing civil commitment statutes, the
Kansas Legislature had conceded that sexually violent predators are
not treatable; since no treatment is possible the court reasoned, then
there is no mental illness and, therefore, "the provisions of the Act
for treatment appear somewhat disingenuous."'m
15

Id. at 2080.

1571d.

at 208 1.

158 Id. at 2082.
159 Id. at 2082-83.
161
Id. at
161In
1

2079.
re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 136.

62 Id.
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Justice Thomas acknowledged that one could read this language
to mean that the Kansas Supreme Court determined that Hendricks'
condition was untreatable and that the act's sole purpose was
incapacitation. 16 3 Even if that were so, Justice Thomas pointed out,
it was constitutionally inconsequential because the Court had "never
held that the Constitution prevents a State from civilly detaining
those for whom no treatment is possible, but who nevertheless pose
a danger to others."" Nor was it of any help to Hendricks' claim
to read the Kansas Supreme Court's decision as having concluded
that Hendricks' condition was treatable but that no treatment was
being provided him. Justice Thomas pointed to both the lower
court's concession that while not its overriding purpose, an
ancillary purpose of the act was to provide treatment and that
language in the statute itself mandates treatment to individuals like
Hendricks. 65 He further pointed out that "[a]lthough the treatment
program initially offered Hendricks may have seemed somewhat
meager,. . . he was the first person committed under the Act." 66

Justice Kennedy concurred but said that the result would be
different if commitment were used for retribution or deterrence, or
if "mental abnormality" turns out to be "too imprecise a category
to offer a solid basis for concluding that civil detention is justified.
, '67 Such hesitancy appears to be characteristic of Justice
Kennedy's generally cautious approach to outer-limit constitutional
issues - a sort of wanting to keep options open. I'm not sure I
know the extent of it here but it could be important (since his was
the fifth vote in Hendricks) in future attempts to use civil
commitment procedures for confinement of persons with disorders
that have received little or no recognition as mental "illnesses."
In this case, Justice Kennedy's vote was based on his willingness
to insist on less than unanimity in the psychiatric profession as to
the nature of pedophilia. "The Constitution," he stated, "permits a

163

Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084.

164

id.

65

id.

1

166MId. at 2085.
67

Id. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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one reasonable professional view, while rejecting
State to follow
16
another." 8
Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter
and partially by Justice Ginsburg.' 69 He agreed with the majority
that the statute's definition of "mental abnormality" satisfies
substantive due process. 170

But, in concluding that the act was

punitive, and thus a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause,' he
seized on the State's concession that Hendricks' condition is
treatable, that the act failed to provide Hendricks and others like
him with any treatment until after his release date and only
inadequate treatment thereafter, and that the committing authority
was not required to consider less restrictive alternatives. "
The immediate impact of Hendricks is twofold: (1) it strengthens
similar statutes in other states (Arizona, California, New Jersey,
Minnesota, Washington, Wisconsin) and will encourage others such
as New York to enact one in the near future; (2) it has figured
prominently in recent decisions upholding Megan's Law statutes as
not violative of either double jeopardy or ex post facto
prohibitions.' In the Second Circuit's decisions upholding New
York's Megan's Law, Judge Newman stated that Hendricks
"implicitly approves" the analysis that, short of a display by a
plaintiff that a civil law is punitive in nature, the legislature's stated
intent to create a nonpunitive statute will generally be dispositive.'
Thus, when combined with Megan's Law statutes, which many
states have adopted in one form or another, sexual predator statutes
such as that upheld in Hendricks now provide a potent one-two
16
8

Id. (Kennedy, I., concurring).
Id. at 2087 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
170 Id. at 2087-88 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
171 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (3). The Ex Post Facto Clause states that "No
Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed." Id. See also U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10 (1). This section states in relevant part that: "No State
shall.. . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility." Id.
Id. at 2087 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1997); E.B. v. Verniero, 119
'
F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997).
'"' Doe v Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1275 (2d Cir. 1997).
'6
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punch as to sex offenders, the clamor for which politicians may
find irresistible.
However, there may be some serious side-effects to the
enactment of sexual predator statutes. As Ira Mickenberg of the
D.C. Public Defender's Office asks, "once a state adopts a predator
law, will any person accused of a violent sex crime ever be willing
to accept a plea bargain?," and points out that "[i]t doesn't make
much sense for an accused person to plead guilty in return for a
shorter sentence if the state is going to civilly commit him for life
once his criminal term is over." 75 If that is the case, he adds, then
some victims will be required to testify at trial and will not be
spared the agony of reliving their trauma. 176
It is important to appreciate that Hendricks does not rest on the
principle that mere dangerousness is enough to confine; there must
also be a "mental abnormality." Nonetheless, the Court has taken
a giant step away from our traditional approach to crime-conviction, sentence, punishment; Hendricks purports to tell us that
incarceration in this context is not punishment. Do you believe it?
Although not of constitutional dimension, the Court's 5-4 ruling
in Old Chief v. United States 177 is worth some discussion. The
issue in the case is one that arises whenever the federal government
prosecutes a defendant under 18 U.S.C. 922 (g) (1)178 for being a
felon in possession of a firearm and the defendant offers to stipulate
to the existence of the prior felony and thus keep from the jury the
details of his prior crime; the decision also purports to resolve
conflicts among the federal courts of appeal.
Old Chief was indicted not only for assault with a dangerous
weapon and using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, but

" Ira Mickenberg, CriminalRulings PrimarilyBenefit the Prosecution, NAT'L
L.J., Aug. 11, 1997, at B14.
176 Id. Mickenberg also asks whether a prosecutor even can promise never to
seek civil commitment and whether, if made, it is enforceable. Id.
1 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997).
17818 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1)(1996). The statute makes it unlawful for anyone
"who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for
a term exceeding one year" to "possess in or affecting commerce, any
firearm .... " Id.
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also under Section 922(g)(1) as a felon in possession of a firearm."'
The predicate crime with which he was charged in the 922(g) count
of the indictment was for assault causing serious bodily injury."
He tried to keep the name and nature of that crime from the jury by
offering to stipulate to the fact that, in the words of the statute, he
had been convicted of "a crime punishable by imprisonment
exceeding one year."181 The prosecutor refused to so stipulate, and
the district court allowed documents identifying the offense and
naming the victim into evidence. 1" The Ninth Circuit affirmed,
reasoning that since a stipulation is not proof, regardless of the
defendant's offer to stipulate, the government is entitled to prove a
prior felony offense through probative evidence.'
Writing for the majority, Justice Souter initially rejected Old
Chief's argument that the name and nature of his prior conviction
were irrelevant and thus inadmissible under Rule 402 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence."8 However, Old Chief fared much better under
Souter's analysis of Rule 403, pursuant to which a trial judge may
exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Souter defined
"unfair prejudice" as "the capacity of some concededly relevant
evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground
different from proof specific to the offense charged." " He then
stated that, as a general matter, an item of evidence is not to be
considered in isolation when the Rule 403 balancing test is
perforMed. 18 6 Instead, "what counts as the Rule 403 probative
value of an item of evidence, as distinct from its Rule 401
7

Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 647.

IsO
Id.
18 Id. at 647-48.

'IId.at 648.
'1 Id. at 649 (citing United States v. Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d 688, 690 (9th Cir.
1993)) (further citations omitted).
184 Id.at 649 n.3. Rule 402 states that: "All relevant evidence is admissible,
except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of
Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible." FED. R. EviD. 402.
8
' Id.at 650.
186
Id.
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evidentiary

alternatives."187 In other words, "the discretionary judgment may

be informed not only by assessing an evidentiary item's twin
tendencies" to prove a relevant fact and to create unfair prejudice,
but also "by placing the result of that assessment alongside similar
assessments of evidentiary alternatives."' 88
Justice Souter pointed out that the unfair prejudice that-Old Chief
was concerned with was the likelihood that the jury would use his
prior assault as evidence of criminal propensity which is a risk that
is generally present in a section 922(g)(1) prosecution.' 89 The risk
is especially high, Souter stated, when the prior conviction is for a
gun crime or a crime similar to others charged in the case. 19° Thus,
"Old Chief sensibly worried that the prejudicial effect of his prior
assault conviction, significant enough with respect to the current
gun charges alone, could take on added weight from the related
assault charge against him."' 9' On the other hand, noted Souter,
Old Chiefs proferred stipulation would have covered the priorconviction element without posing this risk - indeed, it
encompassed alternative, relevant, admissible evidence of the prior
conviction that was not merely relevant but ostensibly conclusive
evidence of the prior felony.' 9
Justice Souter observed further that the language of section 922
(g)(1) shows no congressional concern with the specific name or
nature of the prior offense beyond what is necessary to place it
within the broad category of qualifying felonies.'93 Moreover, he
noted, Old Chief clearly meant to admit that his felony did qualify,
by stipulating "'that the Government has proven one of the essential
elements of the offense. ' ' ' 94 As a consequence, "although the
name of the prior offense may have been technically relevant, it

,87 Id. at 652.
188 Id.
189 Id.

190 Id.
191Id.

,92 Id. at 653.
193Id.

'1 Id.
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addressed no detail in the definition of the prior conviction element
that would not have been covered by the stipulation.""
Justice Souter conceded that, as a general rule, a defendant may
not "stipulate his way out of the full evidentiary force of the case as
the government chooses to present it.""" He emphasized,
however, that the government's need for "evidentiary depth to tell a
continuous story has ... virtually no application when the point at
issue is the defendant's legal status resulting from a prior,
independent adjudication."
He noted that "proof of the
defendant's status goes to an element entirely outside the natural
sequence of what the defendant is charged with thinking and doing
to commit the current offense.""' 8 Therefore, he said:
[P]roving status without telling exactly why the status was
imposed leaves no gap in the story of a defendant's subsequent
criminality, and its demonstration by stipulation or admission
neither displaces a chapter from a continuous sequence of
conventional evidence nor comes across as an officious
substitution, to confuse or offend or provoke reproach.1 9
In short, according to Souter's reasoning, in a case in which the
prior conviction is for an offense likely to support conviction on
some improper ground, the only reasonable conclusion is that the
risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the discounted
probative value of the record of conviction, and it is an abuse of
discretion to admit the record when an admission is available.'
On the other hand, Souter took pains to note that apart from proof
of convict status cases, a "prosecutor's choice will generally
survive a Rule 403 analysis when a defendant seeks to force the
substitution of an admission for evidence creating a coherent
narrative of his thoughts and actions in perpetrating the offense for
which he is being tried. " 2a t
195 Id.
196 Id.

197 Id. at 654.
191Id. at 655.
199 Id.

2 Id.
201 Id. at 656.
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Justice O'Connor dissented, joined by the Chief Justice, and
Justices Scalia and Thomas. She took issue with the majority's
conclusion that the "prejudice" resulting from evidentiary use of
the name and nature of the prior conviction is "unfair." 2" She
argued that the structure of section 922 (g)(1) evinces Congress'
understanding that jurors would learn the name and basic nature of
the defendant's prior offense. 2 3 Because certain felonies are
exempt from serving as predicates, a defendant's prior felony
conviction connotes that he has engaged in specific criminal
conduct.20' Even more fundamentally, she said, a person is not
simply convicted of "a crime" or "a felony." 205 He is convicted of
a specific offense and therefore, "[t]he name and basic nature of
petitioner's crime are inseparable from the fact of his earlier
conviction and were therefore admissible to prove guilt." 2 6
I believe the majority has the better of this argument. Justice
Souter's analysis is pragmatically grounded and, without any
burden upon the prosecution, it ensures fairness to a defendant. On
the other hand, Justice O'Connor's argument values formalism over
fairness and is unconcerned with the problems confronting a
defendant charged with possession of a firearm as a felon. 7 Our
system goes to considerable length to exclude a defendant's prior
record from the jury. While prior criminal conduct is admissible to
prove motive, opportunity, intent, plan, identity and the like,20 8 it is
202 Id.
3

(O'Connor, J., dissenting).

d. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

Id. at 657 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
2o
o6 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
204

208

See FED. R. EviD. 404 (b). Rule 404 (b) Provides in relevant part:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the
prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice

in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrail
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not admissible to show the defendant's criminal propensity. While
such a rule works well in the normal case, it has nothing to say in a
case in which the defendant's prior conviction is an element of the
offense. The Old Chief decision makes the crucial point that in
most cases, the prejudice to the defendant from introduction of the
specifics of the prior conviction is inherent. Therefore, its seems
only consistent with our abhorrence of propensity evidence, to
conclude that evidence which carries that danger should be
precluded, especially where the prosecution's purposes are equally
well served by a stipulation to an element of the offense charged the defendant's prior conviction.
However, there are some very interesting practical items that
should be considered, especially by defense counsel, as a result of
Old Chief. The underlying assumption of the case is that it is to the
defendant's advantage always to offer to stipulate to his prior
conviction. But in a recent article, Professor James Duane of
Regent University suggests this might not be the case. 9 He argues
that there are better ways of trying to shield the jury from the
prejudicial details of one's criminal record and that offering to
stipulate is not the best. For example, he points out that status as a
convicted felon is a matter of public record and that defendants
have nothing to lose by admitting it without reservation, preferably
in writing.21° Even if the trial judge denies the motion to preclude
the government from proving the details of the prior crime, says
Duane, the defendant will have lost nothing if the jury learns that he
admitted it unconditionally in open court prior to trial.2 1 Also, he
recommends that counsel should ask the trial judge to take judicial
notice of the defendant's criminal record; if, under Federal Rule of
Evidence 201, a fact is "capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot

notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any
such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
Id.
I James Joseph Duane, LitigatingFelon-wid-a-FirearmCases After Old Chief,
1221Cm. JusT. 18 (1997).
oId. at 19.
211

Id. at 20.
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reasonably be questioned" the judge, he argues, has no discretion
to refuse. '
Professor Duane is also critical of the Court's decision for a
number of reasons. For example, he maintains that because the
decision rests on Rule 403's balancing processes, it actually leaves
defendants with less protection than most of the courts of appeal
had given them by deeming irrelevant under Rule 402, evidence of
the underlying facts of a prior conviction. 3 On the other hand, the
Supreme Court's emphasis on Rule 403's balancing process, he
contends, will make the law less uniform because the balancing
exercise will vary greatly among judges and consequently, at times,
fall more restrictively on a particular defendant. 1 4 Professor
Duane's article is must reading if you represent a defendant charged
with a 922(g) violation.
Despite its extremely limited application, the decision in Bracy v.
Gramle/ 15 deserves mention. However, because time is short and
it is my understanding that Professor Kaufman intends to cover the
case in her presentation later today, I will skip my own discussion
of it.
The Court also rendered several decisions that concern the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. At this symposium in prior years,
it has not been customary for me to discuss the Court's decisions
interpreting the sentencing guidelines, and I have no intention to do
so now. Nonetheless, I feel obliged to mention one such case that
was decided by the Court after summary, rather than plenary,
review. That is because the principle for which its stands draws
negative reaction, indeed anger, in many of the precincts in which I
travel -- precincts that are not as exclusively defense-oriented as
was the case in my prior life with the Legal Aid Society.
The case of which I speak is United States v. Watts,2" 6 in which,
by a 7-2 vote, the Court held that conduct for which a defendant
has been acquitted by a jury nonetheless may be used to enhance his
212 id.
213 Id. at 22-23.
214 Id.
215 117 S. Ct. 1793 (1997).
216 117 S. Ct. 633 (1997).
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sentence for a charge for which he has been convicted. Actually,
there were two cases before the Court: Watts, in which the
defendant was convicted of possessing crack cocaine with intent to
distribute but acquitted of using a firearm in relation to a drug
offense, 17 and Putra, in which the defendant was convicted of
aiding and abetting the possession of one ounce of cocaine base
acquitted of a similar charge involving
with intent to distribute 21but
8
drug.
the
of
five ounces
At sentencing, the district courts found, under the preponderance
of evidence standard allowed by the sentencing guidelines, that the
conduct underlying the acquitted counts had in fact taken place.2" 9
Consequently, in Watts, the defendant received a two-level increase
in his base offense level; in Putra, the acquitted transaction was
deemed "relevant conduct" under section 1B1.3 of the guidelines
and the defendant's sentence was based on the six ounces of crack
rather than one ounce.' In each case, the Ninth Circuit held that
conduct could not be used in sentencing under the
the acquitted
221
guidelines.
The Supreme Court reversed both cases, stating that the Ninth
Circuit's decisions conflicted with the clear implications of 18
U.S.C. 3 6 6 1 ,22 the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and the Court's
own decisions, especially Witte v. United States.m

The Court began its analysis by viewing section 3661 as stating
broadly that no limitation may be placed on the kind of information
about a defendant's "background, character, and conduct" that a
federal court may consider in sentencing, and that this principle was

217 Id.
at

634.

21

1d.at 634-35.
219
Id.
2Id.

Id. at 635.
=' 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1985). Section 3661 states: "No limitation shall be
placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct
of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may
receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence."
Id.
= 515 U.S. 389 (1995).
22
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also established in Williams v. New York. 224 Neither the statute nor
Williams, said the Court, "suggests any basis for the courts to
invent a blanket prohibition against considering certain types of
evidence at sentencing." 225 The Court emphasized that although the
guidelines had made serious inroads on the sentencing discretion of
federal courts, they did not change the aspect of that discretion
embodied in section 3661 and Williams. 26 The Court referred to
USSG 1B1.4,27 whose language is similar to section 3661's and
USSG 1B1.3,m which the Court read to provide a "sweeping"
definition of "relevant conduct. " 229 The Court also rejected the
argument that acquitted conduct may only be considered in
choosing a sentence within the guideline range, and not in setting
that range.'30
The Court placed substantial reliance on Witte, which held that
conduct relied on in sentencing for another offense may
subsequently be prosecuted in its own right without violating the
Double Jeopardy Clause.23' Thus, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion
that the use of acquitted conduct in sentencing amounts to
"punishment" for the acquitted offense is,in the Court's view,
inconsistent with the principle in Witte, that "sentencing
enhancements do not punish defendants for crimes of which he was
not convicted, but rather increase his sentence because of the
manner in which he committed the crime of conviction." 232 The
Court emphasized that the preponderance of evidence standard,
224

337 U.S. 241 (1949).
Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 635.

226 Id.

' USSG § 1B1.4. This section provides in pertinent part that "[in
determining the sentence to impose within the guideline range, or whether a
departure from the guidelines is warranted, the court may consider, without
limitation, any information concerning the background, character and conduct
of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law." Id.
I USSG § 1BI.3. This section provides it relevant part that "all acts and
omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
procured, or willfully caused by the defendant" may be considered." Id.
229 Id.
2 0 Id. at 636.
231Id.
232 Id.
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which may be utilized at sentencing, is less demanding than the
reasonable doubt standard that governs trials.' 3 Therefore, the fact
of acquittal on a specific charge may mean only that the jury was
not satisfied that the government had met its burden of proof, not
that the defendant did not engage in the act.23
Justices Scalia and Breyer wrote concurring opinions in which
they took opposite positions on the issue of whether the Sentencing
Commission could change the rule of this case. Justice Scalia
argued that under Section 3661 and another statutory provision
requiring the guidelines to be consistent with pertinent provisions of
the federal criminal code,235 the commission lacks authority to
forbid courts to consider acquitted conduct otherwise usable at
sentencing, or to compel the use of a higher standard of proof.2 6
Justice Breyer argued that nothing in the Court's decision prevents
the commission from crafting such a directive.W7
Justice Stevens dissented, expressing the view that "[t]he notion
that a charge cannot be sustained by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt may give rise to the same punishment as if it had been so
proved is repugnant" to "longstanding procedural requirements
enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence."23 He argued that
under the sentencing guidelines, section 3661 has a "narrower
scope" than the majority gave it: the guidelines "incorporate the
broadly inclusive language of 3661 only into those portions of the
sentencing decision in which the judge retains discretion," and
determining what conduct is relevant is not one of those areas."'
He distinguished Williams on the ground that it dealt with the
exercise of the sentencing judge's discretion within the range
authorized by law, rather than with rules defining the range within

23 Id. at

637.

M id.
25 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(1) (1997). This section provides that the "Guidelines
[should] be consistent with all pertinent provisions of title 18, United States

Code." Id.
2 Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 638 (Scalia, J., concurring).
7
'" Id. at 638-39 (Breyer, J., concurring).
2 8 Id. at 644 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1 9 Id. at 640 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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which such discretion may be exercised.24° He also pointed out that
the issue of the burden of proof applicable to sentencing facts was
not present in Williams, because the defendant's attorney did not
contest the facts and that Williams was decided in the context of a
sentencing system that focused on subjective assessments of
rehabilitation, a regime replaced by the sentencing guidelines with a
rigid system with a different rationale. 4 He distinguished Witte on
the ground that it was limited to the definition of "punishment" in
the context of double jeopardy. Here, he insisted, the issue "is not
whether a defendant is being twice punished or prosecuted for the
same conduct, but whether her initial punishment has been imposed
pursuant to rules that are authorized by the statute and consistent
with the Constitution. 242
Justice Kennedy dissented because he believed that "the case
raised a question of recurrent importance," one which should not
be decided by the Court in summary fashion.2 43
The case is troubling for several reasons. Regardless of the legal
niceties of burdens of proof differentials, the idea that conduct for
which one has been acquitted nonetheless can serve as the basis for
enhanced punishment draws considerable negative reaction from
ordinary citizens. In this sense, I believe that Justice Stevens more
accurately assesses what people feel about our trial and sentencing
processes. If I am correct in this observation, then the Court's
conclusion, because it is counterintuitive, should have been arrived
at, if at all, after full briefing and oral argument, not summarily. In
this regard it is difficult to quarrel with Justice Kennedy. More
troubling, however, is the reality that only one member of the
Court dissented on the merits; indeed, Justice Kennedy seems to
lean towards the majority view. Consequently, all that remains is
the issue disputed by Justices Scalia and Breyer, whether the
Sentencing Commission can alter the decision. Whether and how
that issue will arise is uncertain.

Id. at 641 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 642 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
242Id. at 642-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
243 Id. at 644 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
240
241
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Well, that pretty much does it. This was not the most exciting
run of cases, but although the Court's criminal law decisions
were "Off-Broadway," they still were a pretty good show.
Thank you.
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